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A B S T R A C T
Ransomware continues to grow in both scale, cost, complexity and impact since its initial discovery
nearly 30 years ago. Security practitioners are engaged in a continual "arms race" with the ransomware
developers attempting to defend their digital infrastructure against such attacks. Recent manifestations
of ransomware have started to employ a hybrid combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption
to encode user’s files.
This paper describes an investigation that tried to determine if the techniques currently employed
in the field of digital forensics could be leveraged to discover the encryption keys used by these types
of malicious software thus mitigating the effects of a ransomware attack.
Memory was captured from a system infected by ransomware and its contents was examined using
live forensic tools, with the intent of identifying the symmetric encryption keys being used. NotPetya,
Bad Rabbit and Phobos hybrid ransomware samples were tested during the investigation. If keys were
discovered, the following two steps were also performed. Firstly, a timeline was manually created by
combining data from multiple sources to illustrate the ransomware’s behaviour as well as showing
when the encryption keys were present in memory and how long they remained there. Secondly,
an attempt was made to decrypt the files encrypted by the ransomware using the found keys. In all
cases, the investigation was able to confirm that it was possible to identify the encryption keys used.
A description of how these found keys were then used to successfully decrypt files that had been
encrypted during the execution of the ransomware is also given.
The resulting generated timelines provided a excellent way to visualise the behaviour of the ran-
somware and the encryption key management practices it employed, and from a forensic investigation
and possible mitigation point of view, when the encryption keys are in memory.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper was to investigate if the techniques
commonly used in live forensics can be applied to the anal-
ysis of ransomware and in so doing allow the investigator to
discover useful cryptographic fragments from the malware
that could later be used to possibly reverse the effects of the
ransomware’s execution. While ransomware first appeared
more than 30 years ago [41], its initial impact on the com-
puting community was small with only a few people being
affected and recovery from the attack being trivial.
The threat landscape changed in 2013 with the release of
the CryptoLocker ransomware [8] where attackers adopted
the three new technologies of cryptocurrency, TOR onion
routing and cryptography. Combining them to produce a
new breed of ransomware programs that have become more
effective and aggressive than anything previously experienced.
These new sophisticated attacks have generated large amounts
of money for the perpetrators. Culminating in two of the
biggest ransomware attacks in recent times, WannaCry which
is estimated to have cost $8 billion and NotPetya which is
estimated to have cost $10 billion [32]. The number of mal-
ware attacks is generally considered to be growing year-on-
year [14, 21].
There exists a separate research field concerning itself




and more specifically with live memory analysis. Some re-
search performed in this field has been into the recovery of
cryptographic fragments, specifically encryption keys, from
the contents of the system’s memory where cryptographic
processes are active. A lot of this research has proven very
successful [4, 26] allowing the researchers to determine the
encryption keys used by the cryptographic programs and sub-
sequently using them to decrypt files. However, no specific
research has been found where these techniques have been
applied to machines that have ransomware active on them.
The main contributions of this research is first to pro-
vide confirmation that forensic techniques are able to be em-
ployed to investigate the volatile memory of machines in-
fected by ransomware and can be leveraged to extract useful
cryptographic fragments that can be used to mitigate the ef-
fects of the attack. Secondly time lining the behaviour of the
ransomware attack and highlighting when and for how long
the encryption keys are available for extraction.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
- A review and discussions of related work in these areas.
Section 3 - Description of the design philosophy. Section
4 - Description of the experiment implementation and the
results achieved. Section 5 - Critical analysis of the exper-
imental results and comparison to similar work in the field.
Section 6 Discussion of the findings.
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2. Related Work
Ransomware is one of the most widespread and damag-
ing threats that internet users face today [48] and is often
classified by the type of encryption used [3]:
• Symmetric Crypto-Ransomware (SCR) uses one key
for both encryption and decryption allowing the attack
to complete in a shorter time, reducing the chances of
it being discovered.
• Asymmetric Crypto-Ransomware (ACR) uses dif-
ferent keys for encryption and decryption.
• Hybrid Key Crypto-Ransomware (HCR) firstly uses
symmetric encryption to encrypt the users files as fast
as possible. After which the symmetric key is en-
crypted using asymmetric encryption.
Historically the incidents of ransomware have been increas-
ing year on year prompting Interpol to declare in 2016 that
ransomware had become the most prominent malware threat
[. . . ] for citizens and enterprises alike [14] and Malware-
Bytes [27] reporting a 500% year on year increase in attacks
demonstrating that the trend upwards is set to continue. Eu-
ropol confirming in 2018 that they believe that ransomware
will retain its dominance for several years to come [15].
Even at the time of writing American government agen-
cies are struggling with the effects of a recent ransomware
attack [34] and US authorities are preparing for similar at-
tacks during the voter registration for the 2020 elections [18].
The NotPetya cyber attack is considered the costliest at-
tack in history [23] with an estimated cost of $10 billion,
whereas WannaCry, according to various estimates, lies in
the $4$8 billion range.
2.1. Live forensics and memory acquisition
Static forensic analysis methods are used in analysing
evidence from a computer system that has been turned off.
The problem with this approach is that significant informa-
tion stored in the computers volatile memory is lost when the
machine is switched off. Examples of information that could
be present in memory are encryption keys, open connection
details, running processes, logged-in users, and so on [5].
To address this issue a complimentary forensics approach
known as live forensics has been developed. Live forensic
analysis primarily targets the computers volatile data which
can only be acquired from a running system. When applied
to ransomware analysis, the live forensics techniques can
be complimented by combining them with malware analy-
sis techniques.
One important aspect of live forensics is the examination
of the systems memory where the malicious code is running.
This examination is normally performed off-line so that the
contents of the memory are not affected by the examination
or the memory capture tools used. To achieve this, the mem-
ory of the system to be examined needs to be captured and
saved.
According to Ruff[40] there are three main memory cap-
turing techniques:
1. Software-based, which typically involves executing ex-
traction programs. An issue with this approach being
that the execution of software would impact the con-
tents of the captured systems memory.
2. Hardware-based, which typically involves connecting
devices, such as PCMCIA cards or USB sticks and
are not always practical in live scenarios as physical
access to the machine is required [31].
3. Virtualization technology-based techniques.
A detailed compilation of the techniques available is pro-
vided in [9] along with advantages and disadvantages of each
approach.
Using the virtualization approach, a snapshot of the anal-
ysed systems volatile memory is extracted using tools pro-
vided by the virtualization software. This snapshot is then
inspected by an analyst using a variety of specialised forensic
tools[33]. Obviously to use this technique the system must
be running in a virtualised environment. The advantages of
this approach being that no trace of any extraction program
exists in the captured memory and any running malicious
programs are unaware that they are being analysed or that
the memory dump was taken [12, 25, 30].
The challenge of memory acquisition in this context is
to discover cryptographic artefacts, such as the encryption
keys, in a manner that allows the target device to continue to
operate normally, while the memory is being acquired [31].
2.2. Cryptanalysis live forensics
Some work has been previously performed into the pos-
sibility of using live forensic techniques to discover encryp-
tion keys that may be present in a computers memory. It was
not possible to find any literature that focused specifically on
ransomware in particular, however similar work on key de-
termination in volatile memory has been performed for SSH
tunnels, encrypted volumes, WinRAR, WinZip and Skype.
[4, 26, 31].
Several research papers confirm the assumption that for
a system to be able to encrypt/decrypt data, then the crypto-
graphic algorithm needs to have access the encryption keys
and these are normally held in volatile memory. Balogh
[4] state that encryption in real-time is only performed in
memory which means that the encryption keys must also
be present there. So in the case of symmetric encryption
it means that the keys also needed for decryption will also
be recoverable from memory. With regards to key manage-
ment, Maartmann-Moe [26] state that it is clear that crypto-
graphic keys need to be present in memory during encryp-
tion when using standard computer hardware.
In extensive tests conducted on 10 different cryptographic
systems the researchers [26] were always able to retrieve all
the cryptographic keys from memory for every application
tested using their specifically developed tool called inter-
rogate. While these researchers have not investigated ran-
somware specifically, their findings strongly suggest that it
would be possible to extract ransomware cryptographic keys
using similar techniques.
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2.2.1. Examination of memory methods
The usual process for locating something is to try to iden-
tify some characteristic of what is being located and then
to look for that characteristic. One characteristic of crypto-
graphic keys is that they are usually chosen at random. Most
code and data is not chosen at random and it turns out that
this differentiation is significant [44]. When data is random
it has higher entropy than patterned information. This means
that it should be possible to locate cryptographic keys among
other data by locating sections with unusually high entropy
[4]. The authors found that the memory block where the
main and the auxiliary AES keys are located has a recogniz-
able structure and high entropy.
In reality, symmetric cryptographic keys are just short
sequences of random looking data, often 1632 bytes long
residing amongst other pieces of data with a much lower en-
tropy.
2.2.2. Identifying keys in memory
In order to extract encryption keys from memory, they
must first be identified [16]. Several researchers have dis-
covered [16, 38, 44], that encryption keys in memory are far
more structured than previously believed and several strate-
gies to locate the keys have been proposed and are discussed
below.
Using a high-entropy searching approach as suggested
by Shamir [44] and tested by [26]. Since it is known that
key data has a higher entropy than non-key data, one way to
locate a key is to divide the data into small sections, measure
the entropy of each section and display the locations where
there is particularly high entropy [44].
Search for certain known patterns in the memory such as
key schedule which are specific to certain types of encryp-
tion [16, 38]. These patterns could also consist of known
memory offsets, specific lengths of high entropy memory lo-
cations, or known patterns of entropy.
2.2.3. Identifying AES keys
From a review of current ransomware samples it has been
determined that the majority of modern crypto ransomware
are now hybrid in nature (HCR) [3]. The public key of the
asymmetric encryption being delivered with the ransomware,
while the private key is retained by the attacker. As the pri-
vate key of the asymmetric encryption is never present on the
machine, this paper will concentrate on the identification of
the key used during the symmetric encryption phase of the
ransomwares execution which in the majority of cases is the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key.
AES is a Substitution-Permutation (SP)-network based
cipher that works on 128-bit blocks, and can use either 128,
198 or 256 bit keys. It is considered by some researchers
to be virtually unbreakable [43] and impossible to decrypt
without the correct key [26].
Modern symmetric key cryptosystems are constructed
by repeatedly applying a simpler function where several iter-
ations or rounds, are done. From the master key, a derivation
function, derives different sub-keys used in each round. This
Fig. 1. AES Key and Key Schedule [26].
is known as the key schedule algorithm and has been stated
by many researchers that this information needs to be present
in memory [4, 17, 26]. This knowledge of the cryptosystem
can be used to search for this key pattern within the memory
[4]. The search criteria being that there is a mathematical
relationship between the master key and sub-keys. The key
schedule is often computed ahead of time, in what appears to
be a security-performance trade-off, and kept in the memory
while encryption/decryption is performed [26]. An example
of an 128-bit empty AES key (all zeros) and its associated
key schedule [26], extracted from memory is shown in Fig. 1.
Notably, the key schedule for a 128 bit AES key is rep-
resented as a flat array of bytes in memory, where the first
16 bytes (or 128 bits) constitutes the original key. The re-
maining 160 bytes are the round keys derived from this key.
For larger AES keys, the corresponding key schedule is also
larger.
Several tools have been developed that use this phenomenon
to identify AES keys in memory such as AESFinder [16, 19],
Volatools [54], interrogate [26] and Findaes [24], however
no research has been found to suggest that they have ever
been used to analyse cryptographic ransomware in particu-
lar.
2.2.4. Method
Some of the key works in the area have used the same
common experimental method [4, 17, 26, 33, 54]. Firstly
running the program under investigation in a virtual envi-
ronment, then using tools from the virtual environment to
capture memory dumps of the systems memory in a secured
and trusted manner. Once the required number of memory
captures has been completed they are then analysed.
Several researchers including [4, 16, 26, 30, 31] have had
success in extracting the encryption keys through the discov-
ery of cryptographic information in volatile memory.
One thing to remember when applying this method to
the ransomware samples analysed in this report is that these
samples perform several steps before they actually begin en-
crypting data on the victims system [33]. So unlike the pro-
grams investigated by other researchers the ransomware en-
cryption keys will not be immediately present in the memory
when the programs starts executing and determining when
to capture the memory becomes critical to the success of the
experiments. Ideally the memory should be captured while
the ransomware is encrypting files. The encryption process
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can last from several minutes to a few hours, and the program
may perform good key management on the completion of en-
cryption by removing the keys from memory, so determining
the point when the memory capture should be performed is
crucial. The technique described uses volatile memory anal-
ysis combined with empirical observations rather than focus-
ing on specific API calls that the ransomware may employ.
3. Design
3.1. Environment design
In order to conduct valid, realistic ransomware experi-
ments the test victim’s machine needs to mimic a real ma-
chine as much as possible with any private or confidential
information removed[20] and ideally isolated from the inter-
net [2]. Based on the research performed by Bose [7], it was
decided to implement the test environment for this project
using the VirtualBox virtualization software provided by Or-
acle.
When designing a test environment, one of the key rec-
ommendations from Rossow [39] was that it should be as re-
alistic as possible. Using these guidelines as well as the three
points raised by Sanabria [42], the test environment was de-
signed to contain three virtual machines. Two of these vir-
tual machines were victim test machines. Only one of which
were ever active at any given time and it is on these where
the ransomware was executed.
In all but the most basic experiments at least one other
system is required to provide network support services [42]
for the victim, as denying all-network access to the sample
under analysis will most likely result in incomplete observa-
tions of the malwares behaviour [13]. Therefore a common
technique [45] was used where a third virtual machine was
present on the virtual network to provide network services
to the victim machines such as DNS, IRC, HTTP as well as
handling possible requests made by the malware back to its
command and control (C&C) server [42].
These machines were connected via a host-only virtual
network connection, and they were the only machines on this
virtual network. This configuration provides complete iso-
lation of these guest machines from the host machine and
thus the hosts network connections. The physical host ma-
chine consisted of a laptop which itself was air gapped, thus
providing a second layer of isolation. Having both network
access and content on the victim virtual machine contributed
significantly to it appearing to the malware as a real ma-
chine, encouraging the malware to behave normally. Appro-
priate containment policies such as firewall and anti-virus
were also deployed on the host machine [39].
3.2. Experiment design
At its most abstract level the designed experiments could
be considered as follows. A ransomware sample is executed
within a virtual environment. During this execution, copies
of the machines volatile memory are taken. Forensic tools
are then used to analyse these captured memory files in an
attempt to discover the encryption key. The found keys are
Fig. 2. Overview of Experiment part 1 & Experiment part 2.
then used to decrypt files encrypted during the ransomware’s
execution to confirm that the correct symmetric encryption
key has been identified.
This investigation can be broken down in to three sepa-
rate sub experiments. The results of which, when combined
were used to validate or disprove the hypothesis that live
forensic techniques could be used to mitigate a ransomware
attack. Each round of experiments began with a fresh ver-
sion of a virtual machine that reflected a realistic worksta-
tion being started and an example of the ransomware under
investigation being executed. The following three experi-
ments were then performed.
3.2.1. Experiment part 1 - Identify the key in memory
A memory dump from the machine where the ransomware
was being executed was captured. It was known during se-
lection of the ransomware samples for these experiments that
AES was being used for the symmetric part of the encryp-
tion, so once the dump had been completed it was analysed
using live forensics tools to determine if the AES key can be
discovered. Special attention being paid to areas of memory
that exhibited high entropy. A graphic representation of this
and the following experiment is shown in Fig. 2.
3.2.2. Experiment part 2 - Key time line creation
A memory dump was taken at regular intervals during
the complete execution life cycle of the ransomware to de-
termine at what point the key is loaded into memory and for
how long it remains there. This aids the execution of ex-
periment part 1 by determining when to execute point A in
Fig. 4. An outcome of this experiment was an approximate
timeline for the execution of the ransomware.
3.2.3. Experiment part 3 - Validate found keys
If any keys were discovered during experiment part 1,
they were tested to determine if they could decrypt any of
the control files encrypted by the ransomware. As indicated
by points B and C in Fig. 4. A tool developed by the au-
thor using the Python programming language was used to
perform the decryption attempt. A graphic representation of
this experiment is shown in Fig. 3.
3.2.4. Combined experiment
The overall experimental suite was based on similar meth-
ods identified during the literature review [4, 17, 26, 33, 54].
While the designed experiments in this investigation have
significant similarities with previous work such as using win-
dows operating systems on virtual machines and using simi-
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Fig. 3. Overview of Experiment part 3.
Fig. 4. Experiment flow.
lar tools for key extraction. These experiments differ in that
multiple key extraction tools on multiple operating systems
were tested and the discovered keys were checked to con-
firm that they successfully decrypted the control files. Also
multiple memory dumps were taken during the experiment
to allow for the creation of a timeline for the ransomware’s
execution. A graphical representation of the overall exper-
iment is given in Fig. 4 and the main steps are discussed
below.
Iterate over Operating Systems versions. When discussing
realism in experimentation Rossow [39] cautioned against
performing experiments on just one operating system and
then drawing general conclusions. To guard against this po-
tential criticism, the experiments performed in this research
were conducted against the top two most commonly used
versions of the windows operating systems currently in use.
Start a fresh VM. Results are only comparable if each sample
is executed in an identical environment [20] so a fresh VM
was started at the beginning of each experiment.
Install Ransomware. The sample to be tested was extracted
from the archive and prepared for execution.
Execute Ransomware. The chosen ransomware sample was
executed from the command line.
Capture Memory. The timings of when to take a copy of the
working memory of the virtual machine was determined by
the outcome of experiment part 2. If the keys became avail-
able in memory, then a copy of the machines memory was
taken, using tools provided by the virtualization software in
similar techniques used by other researchers [30, 33].
Stop VM. Once the required number of memory captures has
been performed, or if the ransomware had completed, then
the victim virtual machine is halted.
Attempt to determine AES keys from captured memory. Anal-
ysis was performed on the captured memory samples with
the aim of identifying candidate AES keys, using the three
tools discussed below:
1. findaes - A tool developed by Kornblum [24] based
on the work by Trenholme [16, 49] and tries to find
the keys using the AES key schedule structure [50].
2. interrogate - A tool developed by Maartmann-Moe
[26] also based on the work by Trendholme[49].
3. RansomAES - A hybrid tool developed by the author
which incorporates logic from the Volatility Frame-
work [53] together with the logic from findaes in an
attempt to improve the accuracy and performance of
the key detection.
Extract Encrypted Files. A set of typically targeted [10] con-
trol files with known content were placed on the victim ma-
chine prior to the ransomware’s execution. Once the ran-
somware had executed, these files were analysed to deter-
mine if they had been encrypted.
Attempt to decrypt files. If any candidate keys were discov-
ered during the analysis stage of the experiment, they were
then used to try and decrypt the encrypted control files ex-
tracted from the victim virtual machine. The AES Initiali-
sation Vector (IV) required for decryption, were contained
within the encrypted file and used in combination with the
candidate keys to decrypt the file.
4. Implementation and results
4.1. Ransomware sample selection
Recent ransomware attacks were researched [11, 18, 23,
34, 51] and based on the findings, it was decided to select
the following three recent ransomware samples for analysis.
All of which used AES for the symmetric portion of the en-
cryption.
NotPetya. This ransomware attack is considered to be the
most damaging attack ever [23].
Bad Rabbit. An adaptation of the NotPetya ransomware
family that emerged in 2018 [46].
Phobos. One of the most recent ransomware samples found
where detailed information is available [22] and also one of
the most prevalent in Q4 2019 [35].
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Specific details of the ransomware samples used were
validated by VirusTotal (www.virustotal.com) are described
in Table 1. The three chosen ransomware samples were simi-
lar to each other in that they all used AES symmetric encryp-
tion and also all used the same key for all files encrypted
4.1.1. Other ransomware
The following ransomware samples were initially con-
sidered before being rejected.
• Wannacry. Testing confirmed what was detailed in
the literature that this strain used unique AES keys for
each encrypted file[6, 52]. After conducting multiple
tests of the memory acquired during the execution of
this malware using all the live forensics tools, no re-
coverable AES keys were found.
• Cerber. This ransomware appears not to use AES en-
cryption.
• Lucky/nmare. The sample of this ransomware required
access to the internet to be able to download the file
encryption modules as they are not delivered with the
initial sample. The services provided by the Debian
virtual machine were not able to trick the ransomware
into executing normally and it was deemed too risky
to allow this external network access.
• Satan, SamSam and GrandCab. It was not possible to
trigger these samples of ransomware to encrypt any of
the control the files or display the ransom message.
4.2. Test machine configuration
The laptop used for testing had no external network con-
nections and as an added precaution was set to airplane mode
and had the wifi card switched off. When discussing the vir-
tual environments this physical machine is referred to as the
host machine as it hosts the virtual environment within Vir-
tualBox.
Three guest machines were defined in the virtual envi-
ronment running on the laptop. Two victim machines with
different operating systems on each, used to test the behaviour
of the ransomware code and one network services machine
that was used to provide any network services. Details of the
virtual guest machines are given in Table 2.
The guest machines were connected together using the
recommended host-only connection technique [20],creating
a separate virtual LAN providing isolation and containment
of the guest machines. The virtual LAN and the guest ma-
chines were run in two separate configurations depending on
which windows version was being tested.
Table 2. Virtual Hardware Configurations
Machine Name Operating System Purpose
Windows 7 Windows 7 UltimateBuild 7600
Ransomware
Victim Machine
Windows 10 Windows 10 ProBuild 10586.494
Ransomware
Victim Machine
Debian Debian 5.2.9 Network Services
The following tools were used during the configuration
of the Debian machine. fakedns.py used to provide DNS
services to the network and INetSim - Considered to be the
best free tool [45] for providing fake network service emu-
lation creating the illusion of a realistic pseudo network that
the malware can interact with if required.
4.3. Experiments
Details of the experiments performed are given below
4.3.1. Experiment part 1 - Identify the key in memory
A fresh VM was started and a copy of the machines mem-
ory was taken prior to the execution of the ransomware, so
that any AES keys that are present in the machines memory
prior to the execution of the ransomware could be identified
and excluded from the experiments results. To aid experi-
ment reproducibility, the commands used to launch each of








After waiting for a short period, a copy of the guest’s
machines memory was taken. The length of waiting time
varied between ten seconds and two minutes depending on
the ransomware strain. The time required to wait was deter-
mined through trial and error. To capture the memory, the
following command was executed on the host machine:
VBoxManage.exe debugvm <VBox Machine Name>
dumpvmcore --filename <filename>.elf
The memory dump file was then analysed by each of the
selected live forensics memory tools. Again to aid repro-
ducibility, the commands used are given below:
findaes <filename>.elf
interrogate -a aes -k 128 <filename>.elf
ransomaes -p <ransomware pid> -t Win7SP0x86 <filename>.elf
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Any keys found resulting from the execution of these
tools were recorded and used as input for experiment part
3. If no keys were found then the experiment was extended
in one minute intervals and new memory dumps taken. The
experiment terminated when keys were found or the execu-
tion of the ransomware completed.
4.3.2. Experiment part 2 - Key time line creation
If keys were discovered in experiment part 1, then this
experiment was also performed. Memory dumps are taken
regularly throughout the execution time frame of the ran-
somware. The time interval used between memory dumps
varied depending on the ransomware sample and was de-
termined via trial and error over multiple executions. The
dumps were analysed using one of the selected tools to con-
firm that they keys were still present. The times when the
keys were present was recorded and a basic timeline for the
ransomware execution was created. The timeline creation
process was predominantly a manual task, combining the re-
sults recorded from the experiments, observations of system
behaviour, descriptions gained from the literature review and
utilisation of the six step ransomware model [29].
4.3.3. Experiment part 3 - Validate found keys
If candidate AES keys were discovered in experiment
part 1, then these were used in an attempt to decrypt the con-
trol files. This was partially an automated task with some
manual steps. A tool decrypt.py was created by the author
to perform the basic AES decryption using the 'AES' cipher
object from the 'Crypto.Cipher' python library.
The program was able to determine the required IV from
the supplied encrypted file and then use this together with the
discovered candidate keys to try and decrypt the file. De-
termination if the file was correctly decrypted remained a
manual task. The resulting decrypted file normally required
extra modifications such as adding a header or removing a
trailer.
5. Results and Discussion
This chapter is divided into separate sections, one for
each of the ransomware samples tested. Each of these sec-
tions discusses the results of the three experiments conducted.
5.1. NotPetya
The execution of the ransomware appeared to follow the
descriptions provided by [6, 52]. The main steps being:
1. Adding persistence and gathering user’s credentials.
2. Scanning the machine for files to encrypt. This sample
seems to ignore the control files with the ’txt’ exten-
sion.
3. Encrypting the identified files using AES encryption
with what appears to be the same AES key being used
for all the files. Interestingly neither the filename or
the file meta information changes when the file is en-
crypted.
4. Attempting lateral movement to other machines, how-
ever no actual evidence of this was discovered.
Fig. 5. NotPetya Ransom Message.
Fig. 6. NotPetya Timeline.
5. After 1 hour, rebooting the machine automatically.
6. Displaying a fake chkdsk command output, while en-
crypting the Mater Boot Record.
7. Once the fake chkdsk completes, the machine reboots
automatically again.
8. After reboot, the ransomware message shown in Fig. 5
is displayed.
5.1.1. Experiment part 1 - Identify the key in memory
All three live forensics tools used to examine the mem-
ory dumps were able to successfully identify AES keys in
the memory of the ransomware process.
5.1.2. Experiment part 2 - Key time line creation
A total of fifteen memory dumps were taken and then
analysed to determine if they contained AES keys. It was
identified that the key became available within 2 minutes of
the start of the ransomware, and remained in memory until
the machine was automatically rebooted by the ransomware
after 60 minutes. The key did not survive the reboot and
was not recoverable from memory after this. A graphical
representation of some of the ransomware’s behaviour and
key availability is shown below in Fig 6.
This timeline correlates well with the findings of other
researchers [6, 52]. However no research was found that
analysed when and for how long the actual key remains in
memory. Using this diagram it is clear to see that it is present
for a total 59 minutes, which is the majority of the ransomware’s
execution time. Also no similar graphical representation of
the ransomware time line was found in the literature, the one
shown in Fig. 6 being generated by the author.
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Fig. 7. Bad Rabbit Ransom Note.
5.1.3. Experiment part 3 - Validate found keys
When the NotPetya ransomware encrypts a file, the first
16 bytes of the file are overwritten with the AES Initialisa-
tion Vector (IV) value [47]. A program was developed that
firstly reads the IV value from the encrypted file, then used
this together with the key found in experiment part 1 to de-
crypt the files contents.
Using this technique pdf, doc, docx, xls and xlsx ex-
tracted control files were successfully recovered using the
same AES key. Each of these file types required different
headers to be inserted and some files required that some bytes
be removed from the end of the file.
5.2. Bad Rabbit
The execution of this ransomware followed the descrip-
tion provided by [1, 28, 37] and is similar to the steps used
by the NotPetya ransomware. The main steps being:
1. Adding persistence.
2. Scanning the machine for files to encrypt. This sample
seems to ignore control files with the ’txt’ and ’jpg’ file
extensions.
3. Encrypting the identified files using AES encryption.
4. After 14 minutes a ransom note file is created on the
C drive.
5. One minute later the machine is automatically rebooted.
6. The machine restarts with what appears to be a nor-
mal windows desktop. However in the background the
MBR is being encrypted.
7. 22 minutes after the initial execution of the ransomware,
the machine automatically reboots again.
8. After reboot, the ransomware message shown in Fig. 7
is displayed and the user is prevented from accessing
their windows installation.
5.2.1. Experiment part 1 - Identify the key in memory
All three live forensics tools used to examine the mem-
ory dumps were able to identify AES keys in the memory of
the ransomware process.
5.2.2. Experiment part 2 - Key time line creation
Again a total of fifteen memory dumps were taken and
analysed to determine if they contained AES keys. It was
Fig. 8. Bad Rabbit Timeline.
identified that the key became available within 1 minute of
the start of the ransomware execution, and only remained in
memory while the encryption was being done. An approx-
imation of this being 30 seconds. The key did not appear
again even after the machine reboot. A graphical represen-
tation of some of the ransomware’s behaviour and key avail-
ability is shown below in Fig. 8. This timeline matches the
description given by [1]. Using the time line diagram it is
clear to see that it is only present for 30 seconds which is a
fraction of the overall execution time and much shorter than
the NotPetya ransomware. The key could possibly be present
at other times, but missed due to the sampling period. No
similar graphical representation of the ransomware time line
was found in the literature, the one shown in Fig. 8 being
generated by the author.
5.2.3. Experiment part 3 - Validate found keys
Files are encrypted using the same format as the Not-
Petya ransomware and the steps described in section 5.1.3
can be used to decrypt the files encrypted with the Bad Rab-
bit ransomware. Using this technique pdf, doc, docx, xls and
xlsx files were successfully recovered using the same AES
key.
5.3. Phobos
The execution of the ransomware followed the descrip-
tion provided by [22]. The main steps being:
1. Adding persistence and gathering credentials.
2. Scanning the machine for files to encrypt. This sample
encrypted all the control files.
3. Encrypting the identified files using AES encryption
with what appears to be the same AES key being used
for all the files initially encrypted. The file names were
also changed.
4. After approximately 2 minutes the ransom note shown
in Fig. 9 is displayed.
5. Interestingly the machine still operates to some extent
and any new files created are encrypted using a differ-
ent AES key. The researcher was not able to discover
this secondary AES key. This could be an area of fur-
ther research it is believed that these keys should also
be present.
6. The machine does not reboot automatically. If the user
reboots the machine, then the same ransomware mes-
sage is displayed.
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Fig. 9. Phobos Ransom Note.
Fig. 10. Phobos Timeline.
5.3.1. Experiment part 1 - Identify the key in memory
All three live forensics tools used to examine the ran-
somware process memory were able to identify the 256 bit
AES key used by the ransomware to encrypt the files.
5.3.2. Experiment part 2 - Key time line creation
Similarly a total of fifteen memory dumps were taken
and analysed to determine if they contained AES keys. It
was identified that the key initially became available within
1 minute of the start of the ransomware execution. The same
AES key was loaded in to memory and removed several times
during this initial encryption of the machine. The key was
erased when the ransom message was displayed. The ran-
somware continued to encrypt any new files created, using a
different AES key. Several unsuccessful attempts were made
to try and capture this secondary key from memory. As with
the previous two ransomware samples no AES key survives
a machine reboot. A graphical representation of some of
the ransomware’s behaviour and key availability is shown in
Fig. 10.
This timeline correlates well with the description given
by [22, 36]. Using this diagram it can be easily seen that
the same AES key is present in memory on several different
occasions. It is also worth bearing in mind that there could
be occasions where the keys presence was missed due to the
sampling period. No similar graphical representation of the
ransomware time line was found in the literature, the one
shown in Fig. 10 being generated by the author.
5.3.3. Experiment part 3 - Validate found keys
Additional information is added to the end of a file that
has been encrypted by the Phobos ransomware. This extra
information includes some padding, followed by what is be-
lieved to be the AES IV value, then followed by 128 bytes
that is the same for all the encrypted files. A detailed de-
scription of the encrypted file appears in the work by Issa
[22] who hypothesis that this 128 byte block could be the
encrypted asymmetric key. There is also a fixed string at the
end of the block, in this case it is ’LOCK96’ but other ver-
sions of Phobos have been observed with different keywords
such as ’DAT260’.
A program was developed that firstly reads the IV value
from the encrypted file, then uses this together with the key
found in experiment part 1 to decrypt the file. Using this
technique pdf, doc, docx, xls and xlsx files were successfully
recovered using the same AES key.
6. Conclusion
Building on other work in the field of live forensics [4,
17, 26], AES key recovery from volatile memory techniques
were successfully used to identify encryption keys being used
by ransomware samples. As research in this specific area was
not identified, techniques and tools used for TrueCrypt and
Skype encryption key recovery were used to identify keys
for recent, high impact ransomware samples. Secondly the
work aimed to attempt to evaluate whether consistent time-
lines of when these keys where stored in memory could be
generated.
Similar execution times and results were recorded for
the findaes and RansomAES live forensic tools, The Ran-
somAES tool created by the author had similar results as
the pure findaes tool, indicating that the added extra func-
tionality for ransomware did not result in an improvement in
performance. The time taken for the interrogate tool to com-
plete was almost 100 times longer. Apart from this extended
execution time all three tools were shown to successfully
identify AES keys being used by three ransomware samples
chosen for the experiments on both windows 7 and windows
10 operating systems. This supports the hypotheses that live
forensic techniques could be used to mitigate a ransomware
attack. The authors believe that the increased execution time
of the interrogate tool could be caused by the implementa-
tion of the logic this tool used to identify the AES key as
fundamentally it is based on the same research as findaes
[50, 49]. Interrogate seems not to take into account the en-
tropy of the candidate keys prior to calculation of the sched-
ule, rather it calculates the schedule for all candidate keys
irrespective their entropy and this may be one reason for the
impact in performance.
However these results support the hypothesis with some
caveats from a forensic investigation point of view. These
being that the machine has not been rebooted since the com-
mencement of the attack, and also that the memory capture
is performed near the start of the ransomware’s execution,
to ensure that the required keys are still present in memory.
Also this technique cannot be applied to all ransomware fam-
ilies, as demonstrated by the analysis of the Wannacry ran-
somware sample, where AES keys were not able to be iden-
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tified.
It was also observed that in case of a ransomware attack
where the user was still able to interact with the operating
system after the initial encryption has completed, such as
the Phobos ransomware, a second AES key looks to be in
memory. This key is being used to perform any subsequent
encryption, such as on any new files created. This approach
being possibly utilised to frustrate the recovery of the origi-
nal key and protect the original encryption. The keys found
during the work seem to align with suggestions from previ-
ous work [4, 17], which indicate that it was likely that these
secondary AES keys in theory should also be available in
memory. Further research is planned to analyse various ran-
somware samples to determine if capture of these secondary
keys is also possible and useful in a forensic investigation.
References
[1] 2017 Malwarebytes LABS, 2017. Bad Rabbit: a closer
look at the new version of Petya/NotPetya. URL:
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/
badrabbit-closer-look-new-version-petyanotpetya/.
[2] Ahmad, M.A., Woodhead, S., Gan, D., 2016. The V-network testbed
for malware analysis. Proceedings of 2016 International Conference
on Advanced Communication Control and Computing Technologies,
ICACCCT 2016 , 629–635doi:10.1109/ICACCCT.2016.7831716.
[3] Al-rimy, B.A.S., Maarof, M.A., Shaid, S.Z.M., 2018. Ransomware
threat success factors, taxonomy, and countermeasures: A sur-
vey and research directions. Computers and Security 74, 144–
166. URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2018.01.001, doi:10.
1016/j.cose.2018.01.001.
[4] Balogh, Š., Pondelik, M., 2011. Capturing encryption keys for
digital analysis. Proceedings of the 6th IEEE International Con-
ference on Intelligent Data Acquisition and Advanced Computing
Systems: Technology and Applications, IDAACS’2011 2, 759–763.
doi:10.1109/IDAACS.2011.6072872.
[5] Bashir, M.S., Khan, M.N.A., 2013. Triage in Live Digital Foren-
sic Analysis. The International Journal of Forensic Science , 35–
44doi:10.5769/J201301005.
[6] Berry, A., Homan, J., Eitzman, R., 2017. Threat Research
WannaCry Malware Profile. URL: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/
threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html.
[7] Bose, M., 2018. A Complete Comparison of VMware
and VirtualBox. URL: https://www.nakivo.com/blog/
vmware-vs-virtual-box-comprehensive-comparison/.
[8] Bradley, S., 2016. Information Security Reading Room Ransomware.
Technical Report. SANS Institute. URL: https://www.sans.org/
reading-room/whitepapers/awareness/paper/37317.
[9] Carvey, H., Casey, E., 2009. Windows Forensic analysis DVD toolkit.
2nd ed., Burlington, MA : Syngress.
[10] CERT-EU, 2017. WannaCry Ransomware Campaign Exploit-
ing SMB Vulnerability. Technical Report. Computer Emergency
Response Team - EU. URL: https://cert.europa.eu/static/
SecurityAdvisories/2017/CERT-EU-SA2017-012.pdf.
[11] Comodo, 2018. 8 Ransomware Attacks that have Occurrred Re-
cently. URL: https://enterprise.comodo.com/forensic-analysis/
ransomware-attacks.php.
[12] Dinaburg, A., Royal, P., Sharif, M., Lee, W., 2008. Ether: Mal-
ware Analysis via Hardware Virtualization Extension. Operating
Systems]: Security and Protection , 51–62URL: http://ether.gtisc.
gatech.edu/ether{_}ccs{_}2008.pdf.
[13] Egele, M., Scholte, T., Kirda, E., Kruegel, C., 2012. A survey on au-
tomated dynamic malware-analysis techniques and tools. ACM Com-
puting Surveys 44. doi:10.1145/2089125.2089126.
[14] Europol, 2016. INTERNET ORGANISED CRIME 2016




[15] Europol, 2018. INTERNET ORGANISED CRIME 2018 IOCTA.
Technical Report. Europol. URL: https://www.europol.europa.
eu/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessment-2018, doi:10.2813/
858843.
[16] Halderman, J.A., Schoen, S.D., Heninger, N., Clarkson, W., Paul, W.,
Calandrino, J.A., Feldman, A.J., Appelbaum, J., Felten, E.W., 2009.
Lest We Remember : Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys. Com-
munications of the ACM, 52, 91–98. doi:10.1145/1506409.1506429.
[17] Hargreaves, C., Chivers, H., 2008. Recovery of encryption keys from
memory using a linear scan. ARES 2008 - 3rd International Confer-
ence on Availability, Security, and Reliability, Proceedings , 1369–
1376doi:10.1109/ARES.2008.109.
[18] Hautala, L., 2019. States brace for ransomware assaults
on voter registries. URL: https://www.cnet.com/news/
wi-fi-6-is-barely-here-but-wi-fi-7-is-already-on-the-way/.
[19] Heninger, N., Feldman, A., 2008. AESKeyFind. URL:
https://github.com/eugenekolo/sec-tools/tree/master/crypto/
aeskeyfind/aeskeyfind.
[20] Hoopes, J., 2009. Chapter 6. Malware Analysis Solutions, in: Vir-
tualization Security Protecting Virtualized Environments. 1st ed..
O’Reilly. chapter Chapter 6. URL: https://learning.oreilly.com/
library/view/virtualization-for-security/9781597493055/{#}toc.
[21] Intelligence, T., Analysis, I., 2019. 2019 SonicWall Cyber Threat
Report. Technical Report July. SonicWall. URL: www.sonicwall.com.
[22] Issa, J., 2019. A deep dive into Phobos ransomware.
URL: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2019/07/
a-deep-dive-into-phobos-ransomware/.
[23] Kapersky, 2018. Top 5 most notorious cyberattacks. URL: https://
www.kaspersky.com/blog/five-most-notorious-cyberattacks/24506/.
[24] Kornblum, J., 2019. findaes. URL: http://jessekornblum.com/tools/
findaes/.
[25] Ligh, M.H., Case, A., Levy, J., Walters, A., 2014. The Art of memory
Forensics. Wiley.
[26] Maartmann-Moe, C., Thorkildsen, S.E., Årnes, A., 2009. The per-
sistence of memory: Forensic identification and extraction of crypto-
graphic keys. DFRWS 2009 Annual Conference 6, 132–140. doi:10.
1016/j.diin.2009.06.002.
[27] Malwarebytes, 2019. Cybercrime Tactics and Techniques Q1 2019.
Technical Report. MalwareBytes. URL: https://www.malwarebytes.
com/pdf/labs/Cybercrime-Tactics-and-Techniques-Q1-2017.pdf.
[28] Mamedov, O., Sinitsyn, F., Ivanov, A., 2018. Bad Rabbit ransomware.
URL: https://securelist.com/bad-rabbit-ransomware/82851/.
[29] McAfee Labs, 2016. Understanding Ransomware
and Strategies to Defeat it. Network Security , 1–
18URL: https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/
wp-understanding-ransomware-strategies-defeat.pdf.
[30] McLaren, P., Buchanan, W.J., Russell, G., Tan, Z., 2019a. Deriving
ChaCha20 Key Streams From Targeted Memory Analysis. Journal of
Information Security and Applications 48. URL: http://arxiv.org/
abs/1907.11941{%}0Ahttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2019.102372,
doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2019.102372, arXiv:1907.11941.
[31] McLaren, P., Russell, G., Buchanan, W.J., Tan, Z., 2019b. Decrypting
live SSH traffic in virtual environments. Digital Investigation 29, 109–
117. doi:10.1016/j.diin.2019.03.010, arXiv:arXiv:1907.10835v1.
[32] Mekynyk, S.A., Speier-Pero, C., Connors, E., 2019. Blockchain is
Vastly Overrated; Supply Chain Cyber Security is Vastly Underrated.
Supply Chain Management Review June. URL: scmr.com.
[33] Nissim, N., Lahav, O., Cohen, A., Elovici, Y., Rokach, L., 2019.
Volatile memory analysis using the MinHash method for efficient and
secured detection of malware in private cloud. Computers & Security
87.
[34] O’Donnall, L., 2019. Coordinated Ransomware Attack Hits
23 Texas Government Agencies. URL: https://threatpost.com/
coordinated-ransomware-attack-hits-23-texas-government-agencies/
S.R.Davies,R.Macfarlane,W.J.Buchanan: Preprint submitted to Elsevier Page 10 of 11
Evaluation of Live Forensic Techniques in Ransomware Attack Mitigation
147457/.
[35] O’Donnell, L., 2020. ThreatList: Ransomware Costs Double
in Q4, Sodinokibi Dominates. URL: https://threatpost.com/
threatlist-ransomware-costs-double-in-q4-sodinokibi-dominates/
152200/.
[36] Panda Security, 2017. Technical Analysis of Bad Rabbit. Panda Se-
curity 5, 1–5.
[37] Perekalin, A., 2018. Bad Rabbit: A new ransomware epi-
demic is on the rise. URL: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/
bad-rabbit-ransomware/19887/.
[38] Ptacek, T., 2008. Recover a Private Key from Pro-
cess Memory. URL: http://www.matasano.com/log/178/
recovera-{%}0Aprivate-key-from-process-memory.
[39] Rossow, C., Dietrich, C.J., Grier, C., Kreibich, C., Paxson, V.,
Pohlmann, N., Bos, H., Van Steen, M., 2012. Prudent practices for
designing malware experiments: Status quo and outlook. Proceedings
- IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy , 65–79doi:10.1109/SP.
2012.14.
[40] Ruff, N., 2008. Windows memory forensics. Journal in Computer
Virology 4, 83–100. doi:10.1007/s11416-007-0070-0.
[41] Salvi, H.U., 2015. Ransomware : A Cyber Extortion. Asian Journal
of Convergence in Technology II.
[42] Sanabria, A., 2007. Malware Analysis : Environment Design and
Architecture. Technical Report. SANS Institute. URL: https://www.
sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/threats/paper/1841.
[43] Saravanan, M., Mukesh, K., 2014. Forensic Recovery of Fully En-
crypted Volume. International Journal of Computer Applications 91,
18–21. doi:10.5120/15892-4896.
[44] Shamir, A., Van Someren, N., 1998. Playing hide and seek’ with
stored keys. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioin-
formatics) 1648, 118–124.
[45] Sikorski, A., Hong, A., 2012. Practical Malware Analysis. No Starch
Press, San Francisco.
[46] SonicWall, 2019. Unmasking the threats that target glkobal enter-
prises, governments abd SMBs. Journal of Chemical Information and
Modeling 53.
[47] Sood, K., Hurley, S., 2017. NotPetya Technical Anal-
ysis A Triple Threat: File Encryption, MFT Encryp-
tion, Credential Theft. URL: https://www.crowdstrike.
com/blog/petrwrap-ransomware-technical-analysis-triple\
-threat-file-encryption-mft-encryption-credential-theft/.
[48] Sophos, 2019. Ransomware: How an attack works - Sophos Com-
munity. Sophos , 1–2URL: https://community.sophos.com/kb/en-us/
124699.
[49] Trenholme, S., . Rijndael’s key schedule. URL: https://www.samiam.
org/key-schedule.html.
[50] Trenholme, S., 2014. findaes. URL: https://sourceforge.net/
projects/findaes/.
[51] Vanderburg, E., 2019. A Timeline of Ransomware Advances. URL:
https://www.tcdi.com/ransomware-timeline/.
[52] Vipre Security, 2017. WannaCry Technical Analysis : Support.
URL: https://support.threattracksecurity.com/support/solutions/
articles/1000250396-wannacry-technical-analysis.
[53] Volatility, 2019. Volatility Foundation. URL: https://www.
volatilityfoundation.org/.
[54] Walters, A., Petroni, N.L., 2007. Volatools: Integrating Volatile
Memory Forensics into the Digital Investigation Process. Black Hat
DC , 1–18.
S.R.Davies,R.Macfarlane,W.J.Buchanan: Preprint submitted to Elsevier Page 11 of 11
